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INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE1 
 Amici curiae are labor economists and social sci-
entists listed in Appendix A. Amici have substantial 
expertise in employment discrimination or the harm-
ful effects of discrimination on older individuals and 
the labor market. Amici are interested in this case be-
cause stronger anti-discrimination laws improve older 
workers’ chances of being hired, benefitting them and 
the economy.  
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 Hiring discrimination against older workers was 
the central problem that the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (“ADEA”) sought to address; that 
much is clear from the Act’s extensive legislative his-
tory. Yet, research shows that age discrimination in 
hiring remains pervasive. Managers often hold nega-
tive age-related stereotypes – for example, that older 
workers are slow, or resistant to new technology – 
which too easily infect hiring decisions. Thus, older job-
seekers fare much worse than their younger counter-
parts in finding work, placing them at risk of poverty. 
 
 1 No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in 
part, and no counsel or party made a monetary contribution in-
tended to fund the preparation of this brief. No person other than 
the amici curiae or their counsel made a monetary contribution to 
the preparation or submission of this brief. Correspondence evi-
dencing the parties’ consent to the filing of this brief are on file 
with the clerk. The parties were notified ten days prior to the due 
date of this brief of the intention to file. 
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 Stronger anti-discrimination law helps older 
workers find new jobs more easily, much as anti- 
discrimination law has helped reduce race and sex 
discrimination. Moreover, one can infer based on re-
search on sex and race discrimination that disparate 
impact liability helps to reduce employer reliance on 
age stereotypes in hiring and to prompt managerial 
change. 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 
ARGUMENT 
I. AGE DISCRIMINATION IN HIRING WAS 
CONGRESS’ CENTRAL CONCERN IN EN-
ACTING THE ADEA 
 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(“ADEA”) opens with Congress’ first and central find-
ing: “In the face of rising productivity and affluence, 
older workers find themselves disadvantaged in their 
efforts to retain employment, and especially to regain 
employment when displaced from jobs.” 29 U.S.C. 
§ 621(a)(1) (emphasis added). The history of the 
ADEA’s passage reveals that “especially” is an under-
statement. Discrimination in hiring was, overwhelm-
ingly, the problem Congress enacted the ADEA to 
address. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 90-723, at 4 (1967) (“Sen-
ate Report”) at 4 (the “primary purpose of the bill” is 
“the hiring of older workers”); accord H.R. Rep. No. 90-
805 at 1 (1967) (“it is the purpose of [the ADEA] to pro-
mote the employment of older workers based on their 
ability”); Statement of Sen. Javits, Age Discrimination 
in Employment: Hearing on S. 830 and S. 788 Before 
3 
 
the S. Subcomm. on Labor, Comm. on Labor and Public 
Welfare, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. 22 (1967) at 28 (“I think 
we all agree on the ultimate objective of this hearing: 
that is, to report a meaningful bill to protect the oppor-
tunities of older workers to find employment”); State-
ment of Rep. Dent, 113 Cong. Rec. 34746 (1967) (“the 
problem addressed . . . is so obvious that to belabor it 
is to dull it. I am talking about the frustration and fail-
ure many workers incur in trying to gain employment 
when they happen to be 40, 50, or even 60 years of 
age”). Indeed, the fact that hiring discrimination dom-
inated the debate is perhaps the most surprising as-
pect of the legislative record to the contemporary 
reader.  
 In Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005), 
this Court held that the ADEA includes a disparate im-
pact cause of action, subject to the defense provided by 
its “reasonable factors other than age” provision. “It is 
a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the 
words of a statute must be read in their context and 
with a view to their place in the overall statutory 
scheme.” Roberts v. Sea-Land Services, Inc., 566 U.S. 
93, 101 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Did 
Congress create a disparate-impact cause of action un-
der the ADEA, only to exclude hiring discrimination 
from its application? One should hesitate before con-
cluding that the ADEA “adopted such a topsy-turvy ap-




 The Wirtz Report (Dep’t of Labor, The Older Amer-
ican Worker: Age Discrimination in Employment, Re-
port of the Secretary of Labor Under Section 715 of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (1965), reprinted in U.S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission, Legislative 
History of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 
Doc. No. 5 (1981)) was central to the development of 
the ADEA, and has been central to this Court’s under-
standing of the statute. See, e.g., Smith, 544 U.S. at 
232-33, 238; General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. 
Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 587-88, 590 (2004). The Wirtz Re-
port was prepared by Secretary of Labor W. Willard 
Wirtz in 1965 by order of Congress, and was based 
upon (and contained a separate volume of ) detailed 
and accessible governmental labor market research 
studies. Wirtz Report, Letter of Transmittal; Wirtz Re-
port, Research Materials iii (“Research Materials”) 
(identifying participating agencies). The overarching 
concern raised by the Wirtz Report was discrimination 
in hiring (accord Barbara Lindemann, et al., Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Law 1-5 (2d ed. 2015)), and 
the prevalence of hiring discrimination was exten-
sively documented in the accompanying research ma-
terials. 
 The Wirtz Report identifies the fact that “employ-
ers and supervisors often rate their own older workers 
high in overall performance, but are at the same time 
reluctant to hire new employees in the same age brack-
ets,” Wirtz Report at 9, as the central puzzle of hiring 
discrimination. The Report points to numerous prac-
tices that contribute to this puzzle. For example, the 
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Report and its studies discuss the arbitrary use of “cat-
egorical” age restrictions (including preferences for “re-
cent college graduates,” Research Materials at 113); 
they also note the pre-employment use of “formal em-
ployment standard[s],” such as high-school diploma re-
quirements, Wirtz Report at 3, to provide “evidence of 
desirable personal characteristics” rather than to 
“measure or contribute to job performance,” Research 
Materials at 67.  
 Later sections of the Wirtz Report note in greater 
detail the “forces of circumstance” that affect the hiring 
of older workers, Wirtz Report at 11. These include dif-
ferences (e.g., in educational attainment, id. at 11-13, 
and health status, id. at 11) that are, at least in some 
cases, relevant to job performance. In addition, the 
Wirtz Report discusses “institutional arrangements 
that indirectly restrict the employment of older work-
ers.” Id. at 15. These include “a broad range of person-
nel programs and practices,” id., such as seniority 
systems, employee benefit plans, and promotion-from-
within policies, 2 some of which provide security for al-
ready-employed older workers but “ironically” create 
 
 2 Even in 1967, there was reason to question the reasonable-
ness of excluding older workers under these policies. See Senate 
Report at 269 (testimony of John Willard, National Employment 
Association (a trade group of employment agencies) (“in the fluid 
and dynamic state that our business economy is in at the present 
time,” employers cannot count on the ambitious young worker 
staying around long enough to be available for promotion in the 
course of “orderly succession”).  
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obstacles to the hiring of displaced older workers. Id. 
at 2; see also Research Materials at 59-60.3  
 As to these factors, Congress made choices: it used 
express exclusions for some, but not for others. In the 
case of bona fide seniority systems and employee ben-
efit plans, the bill was amended at Senator Javits’ 
strong suggestion to craft a partial exemption aimed 
at removing this obstacle to hiring. See 29 U.S.C. 
§ 623(f )(2); S. Rep. No. 90-723, at 4 (1967); id. at 13 (In-
dividual Views of Mr. Javits). But except in the case of 
seniority systems and benefit plans, Congress rejected 
the use of exemptions. In the case of age-restricted 
management training programs, for example, the 
House rejected an amendment sought by industry that 
would have exempted such programs. The reason was 
overbreadth: “[a]lmost any training, or opportunity for 
acquiring experience on the job, might be construed as 
leading to future advancement to management posi-
tions.” H.R. Rep. No. 90-805 at 4 (1967). Similarly, the 
 
 3 The dissent in Smith used the Wirtz Report’s distinction 
between “arbitrary discrimination” on the one hand and these 
“circumstances” and “institutional arrangements” on the other to 
argue against the availability of disparate impact claims under 
the ADEA, 544 U.S. at 255-56 (O’Connor, J., dissenting), but that 
position was rejected by the Court. Reviewing these same pas-
sages of the Wirtz Report – passages all of which concerned hiring 
discrimination – the Smith Court concluded that Congress’ re-
sponse to these issues was to allow disparate impact claims under 
the ADEA, but subject to the “narrower” “reasonable factors other 
than age” defense. 544 U.S. at 240-41 (Stevens, J., opinion of the 
Court) (discussing the Wirtz Report and holding that “the RFOA 
provision reflects” the differences between age discrimination and 
“race or other classifications protected by Title VII”). 
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House Report noted that in some industries there were 
acknowledged concentrations of older workers, and 
that the hiring of younger workers might be justified 
by the need to maintain a measure of age balance in 
the workforce. Id. at 7. In both of these cases, Congress 
called for case-by-case assessment of the adverse im-
pact of such programs on older workers balanced 
against the need for such programs. Id. (“it is expected 
that the Secretary will recognize these particular situ-
ations and treat them according to their individual 
merits on a case-by-case basis”); accord Senate Report 
at 7 (calling for the statute to be “administered” in a 
way that is sensitive to age-balance issues in indus-
tries with high concentrations of older workers).4 
 The Wirtz Report closes by calling for “a national 
policy with respect to hiring on the basis of ability ra-
ther than age,” which would result in increasing the 
availability of jobs for older workers. Wirtz Report at 
23. The ADEA was Congress’ answer to that call, and 
the disparate impact cause of action is a crucial part of 
it. The ADEA’s “reasonable factors other than age” de-
fense (which, per Smith, is the defense applicable to 
disparate impact claims) is well-designed to permit the 
kind of case-by-case analysis proposed by the House 
 
 4 See also Age Discrimination in Employment: Hearing on 
H.R. 3651, H.R. 3768, and H.R. 4221 Before the Gen. Subcomm. 
on Labor, Comm. on Education and Labor, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. 68 
(1967) (statement of Rep. Dent, noting, over industry objections, 
that “many employers use [educational requirements] as their 
dodge or coverup for not wanting to employ a person over 40 years 
of age” and that the ADEA would require employers to “consider 
the effect” of such requirements). 
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and Senate Reports. As this Court explained in Texas 
Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. In-
clusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2523 
(2015), “reasonableness” defenses to disparate impact 
claims exist to allow for countervailing “legitimate con-
cerns,” particularly those which serve interests that 
are themselves consistent with the goals of the statute. 
“To be sure, the [Fair Housing Act] framework may not 
transfer exactly to the [age-discrimination] context, 
but the comparison suffices for present purposes.” Id. 
The need for sensitivity in the application of the dis-
parate impact standard is not reason to exclude it from 
the “heartland,” id. at 2522, of the ADEA – which is the 
problem of hiring discrimination.  
 
II. SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH SHOWS 
THAT AGE DISCRIMINATION IN HIRING 
REMAINS PERVASIVE 
A. Older Workers Face Discrimination in 
Hiring 
 Age discrimination in hiring has not disappeared 
in the ADEA’s wake. There is significant scholarly con-
sensus that age discrimination, especially at the hiring 
stage, “remains pervasive.” David Neumark & Joanne 
Song, Do Stronger Age Discrimination Laws Make So-
cial Security Reforms More Effective? 108 J. Pub. Econ. 
1, 1-2 (2013) (citing studies); see also Scott J. Adams & 
David Neumark, Age Discrimination in U.S. Labor 
Markets: A Review of the Evidence, in Handbook on the 
Economics of Discrimination 203 (William M. Rogers 
III, ed., 2006). A recent review of literature on age 
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discrimination concluded that, despite differences in 
methodological approaches, “[t]he main studies almost 
uniformly find evidence of age discrimination in hir-
ing.” David Neumark, Experimental Research on Labor 
Market Discrimination, 54 (2016), http://www.nber.org/ 
papers/w22022 (forthcoming J. Econ. Literature). 
Studies find that older workers fare worse than their 
younger counterparts “in terms of unemployment du-
ration, the probability of getting hired, their incidence 
of displacement and the consequences of displacement 
in terms of reemployment earnings.” Adams & Neu-
mark, Age Discrimination in US Labor Markets, supra, 
at 206; Lora A. Phillips Lassus, Steven Lopez, & Vin-
cent J. Roscigno, Aging Workers and the Experience of 
Job Loss, 41 Res. in Soc. Stratification and Mobility 81, 
81-82 (2015). 
 There is no single explanation for employers’ dis-
crimination against older job applicants. However, age-
related stereotypes – for example, that older workers 
are resistant to change, slow, or difficult to train – per-
sist among managers. Richard A. Posthuma & Michael 
A. Campion, Age Stereotypes in the Workplace: Com-
mon Stereotypes, Moderators, and Future Research Di-
rections, 35 J. Mgmt. 158, 159 & 162 (2009); Robert M. 
McCann & Shaughan A. Keaton, A Cross Cultural In-
vestigation of Age Stereotypes and Communication Per-
ceptions of Older & Younger Workers in the USA and 
Thailand, 39 Educ. Gerontology 326, 335 (2013) (“older 
workers . . . were generally seen by young workers as 
more uncomfortable with new technology, less flexible 
and more cautious on the job, and more loyal”); Vincent 
10 
 
J. Roscigno, et al., Age Discrimination, Social Closure 
and Employment, 86 Soc. Forces 313, 314 (2007); Gil-
bert C. Gee, et al., Age, Cohort and Perceived Age 
Discrimination: Using the Life Course to Assess Self-
Reported Age Discrimination, 86 Soc. Forces 265, 268 
(2007) (“employers and the lay public prefer workers 
in their 30s and . . . negative attitudes begin to rise 
around age 40”). One study showed that older appli-
cants who tout their experience and maturity in order 
to “proactively suggest that their age is associated with 
qualities that employers value” fare worse than those 
who deemphasize their age or stress their youthful 
qualities. Marc Bendick Jr., et al., Employment Dis-
crimination Against Older Workers: An Experimental 
Study of Hiring Practices, 84 J. Aging & Soc. Pol’y 25, 
40-41 (1996). Likewise, some employers assume that 
younger people will work for lower wages, incur fewer 
significant health expenses and take less time off 
to deal with illness, and stay in their jobs longer. 
Roscigno, et al., supra, at 315; see also Nicole Maestas 
& Julie Zissimopoulos, How Longer Work Lives Ease 
the Crunch of Population Aging, 24 J. Econ. Persps. 
139, 152-53 (2010). Thus, decades after the Wirtz Re-
port, “[e]vidence continues to mount that statistical 
discrimination, judgment based on a group’s character-
istics rather than the individual’s, is an important fac-
tor in the hiring and retention of older workers.” Id. In 
this vein – and of particular relevance to disparate im-
pact in hiring – one group of researchers reasoned that 
“explicit ageism is largely invisible, yet discriminatory 




perceived costs of ageing employees outweigh what 
employers deem as the benefits.” Roscigno, et al., su-
pra, at 325. 
 “Few human resource management processes ri-
val hiring in impact on the distribution of employment 
opportunities and rewards.” Marc Bendick, Jr. & Ana 
P. Nunes, Developing the Research Basis for Control-
ling Bias in Hiring, 68 J. Soc. Issues 238, 238 (2012). 
Yet, initial hiring decisions are especially prone to 
bias, because they are often made without detailed 
knowledge of individual applicants or their past per-
formance. Id. at 242-43. Without detailed, person- 
alized information about applicants, employers can 
easily fall back on stereotypes to winnow down the 
pool. 
 Researchers have measured hiring bias against 
older workers largely by comparing the reactions of 
employers to resumes of comparably qualified older 
and younger applicants.5 For example, one study 
 
 5 Older workers also self-report significant age-related bias 
in the workplace, both in response to researchers, and in EEOC 
charges alleging age discrimination. See, e.g., Sarah von Schrader 
& Zafar E. Nazarov, Trends and Patterns in Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA) Charges, 38 Research on Aging 580, 588 
(2015); AARP, Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination 
Act: National Public Opinion Report, 6 (2012) http://www. 
aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/research/surveys_statistics/work_and_ 
retirement/powada-national.pdf (about one-third of older workers 
report experiencing or witnessing age discrimination); Richard W. 
Johnson & David Neumark, Age Discrimination, Job Separations, 
an Employment Status of Older Workers: Evidence from Self- 
Reports, 32 J. Hum. Resources 779, 782 (1997) (based on worker 
self-reports, “age discrimination may be an important factor in  
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compared employers’ reactions to otherwise-similar 
job applicants who were aged 32 and 57 years old, re-
spectively, and found that employers responded more 
favorably to the younger applicant 42 percent of the 
time, and more favorably to the older applicant just 
one percent of the time. Marc Bendick, Jr., et al., No 
Foot in the Door: An Experimental Study of Employ-
ment Discrimination Against Older Workers, 10 J. Ag-
ing & Social Pol’y 5, 10-11 (1999). A more recent, large-
scale study compared employers’ reactions to more 
than 40,000 job applications, and found evidence of hir-
ing discrimination against older women. David Neu-
mark, et al., Is It Harder for Older Workers To Find 
Jobs?, New and Improved Evidence from a Field 
Experiment, 3 (2015) http://www.nber.org/papers/w21669. 
Another similar study, focused on women, found that 
“younger applicants are 42 percent more likely than 
older applicants to be offered an interview in Mas- 
sachusetts and 46 percent more likely in Florida.” 
Joanna N. Lahey, Age, Women, and Hiring: An Experi-
mental Study, 43 J. Hum. Resources 30, 46 (2008). 
That means an older job seeker must send out eight 
more resumes in Massachusetts and seven more in 
Florida than her younger counterpart to get a single 
interview. Id. at 37. In these terms, it is easy to see how 
employers’ preferences for younger workers over their 
 
 
determining job separations and employment status of older 
workers”). Other research suggests workers are often correct in 
perceiving discrimination. See Gee, et al., supra, at 281 (2007) 
(“close match” between employers’ stated preferences for younger 
workers and workers’ reported experiences of discrimination.). 
13 
 
similarly qualified older counterparts can translate 
into weeks or months of additional unemployment and 
job-searching for older workers, if not total inability to 
find a job. 
 
B. Age Discrimination in Hiring Harms 
Older Workers And the Economy 
 Americans are living longer and healthier lives, 
and the population as a whole is aging. Neumark & 
Song, Do Stronger Age Discrimination Laws Make So-
cial Security Reforms More Effective?, supra, at 1. But 
longer life expectancy means that Americans will ei-
ther need to save more during the earlier years of their 
working lives to see them through retirement, or – 
more likely – work longer. Reflecting that dynamic, the 
number of Americans in the labor force who were aged 
45 years or older nearly doubled between 1990 and 
2010, and individuals aged 55 years or older may com-
prise more than one-quarter of the labor force by 2020. 
Von Schrader & Nazarov, supra, at 581. 
 Age discrimination in hiring has a complex set of 
effects on older workers themselves and the economy 
as a whole. First, preventing “[a]ge discrimination in 
hiring is especially important” in allowing aging work-
ers to remain in the workforce. Neumark, et al., Is It 
Harder for Older Workers To Find Jobs?, supra, at 1 
(emphasis in original). This is in part because aging 
workers may need to change to a less physically de-
manding job, or find a part-time job to act as a bridge 
to retirement; if they cannot, their alternatives will be 
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to remain in an undesirable job for longer, or simply to 
retire earlier. Id. But earlier-than-intended retirement 
places aging workers at risk of slipping into poverty. In 
a 2012 survey of 1,000 Americans aged 50 or older, 
more than half of those who were not yet retired said 
they were not close to being able to retire comfortably; 
sixteen percent of those who were already retired pre-
dicted that their savings would run out, necessitating 
a return to work. AARP, Protecting Older Workers 
Against Discrimination Act, supra, at 5. Older widows 
are especially at risk; they “suffer an average 30 per-
cent drop in living standards upon widowhood and are 
more likely to be living in poverty than are other 
groups.” Lahey, supra, at 31; see also Administration on 
Aging, US Department of Health & Human Services, 
A Profile of Older Americans: 2014, 5 (2014), https://aoa. 
acl.gov/aging_statistics/profile/2014/docs/2014-profile.pdf 
(thirty-five percent of older women in 2014 were wid-
ows). 
 Further, older workers are becoming increasingly 
likely to face layoffs or other job displacement relative 
to their younger counterparts. Adams & Neumark, Age 
Discrimination in US Labor Markets, supra, at 197-98; 
Henry S. Farber, Job Loss in the Great Recession: 
Historical Perspective From the Displaced Workers Sur-
vey, 1984-2010, 7 (2011), http://www.nber.org/papers/ 
w17040.pdf. And when job displacement occurs, dis-
crimination in hiring (among other factors) means that 
older workers also tend to face longer periods of unem-
ployment than younger workers. Lahey, supra, at 46; 
see also Neumark, Experimental Research on Labor 
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Market Discrimination, supra, at 5; Lassus, et al., su-
pra, at 81-82. Among those who lose their jobs, “older 
workers have the lowest reemployment probabilities, 
the longest time to reemployment, high probabilities of 
part-time employment and the largest wage losses.” 
Barry T. Hirsch, et al., Occupational Age Structure and 
Access for Older Workers, 53 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 
401, 402 (2000).  
 Because of those dynamics, older workers felt 
acutely the effects of the 2007-2009 Great Recession. 
During that time, unemployment durations “rose far 
more dramatically” for older than younger workers, 
and those who found new jobs tended to face much 
larger earnings losses than their younger counter-
parts. David Neumark & Patrick Button, Did Age Dis-
crimination Protections Help Older Workers Weather 
the Great Recession?, 33 J. Pol’y Analysis & Mgmt. 566, 
566 (2014); see also Jessica Z. Rothenberg & Daniel S. 
Gardner, Protecting Older Workers: The Failure of the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 38 J. 
Soc’y & Soc. Welfare 9, 22 (2011) (unemployment rate 
for adults aged 55 or older more than doubled between 
June 2008 and June 2009, whereas it increased 70 per-
cent for the population at large, and older adults spent 
an average of 30 weeks looking for a new job, compared 
to a national average of 22 weeks); Farber, Job Loss 
in the Great Recession, supra, at 23 (Great Recession 
“[j]ob losers aged 55-64 earn 16 percent less than do 
job losers aged 25-34. . . . The average earnings loss is 
much larger when the worker had accumulated sub-
stantial tenure on the lost job”).  
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 When older people cannot find work, one alterna-
tive is to claim Social Security benefits earlier than 
planned; indeed, many older Americans did just that 
during the Great Recession, as they have during 
other economic contractions. Matthew S. Rutledge & 
Norma B. Coe, Great Recession-Induced Early Claim-
ers: Who Are They? How Much Do They Lose?, Center 
for Retirement Research at Boston College, 4 (2012), 
http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/wp_2012- 
12-508.pdf. But claiming Social Security earlier means 
a lower level of monthly benefits, making it more diffi-
cult for retirees to make ends meet, and with reverber-
ations throughout the economy. Id.; Alicia H. Munnell 
& Matthew S. Rutledge, The Effects of the Great Reces-
sion on the Retirement Security of Older Workers, 650 
The ANNALS of the Am. Acad. of Pol. & Soc. Sci. 124, 
126 (2013) (discussing the effects of claiming social se-
curity early and explaining that “Social Security will 
provide less in the future than it does today”); Gary 
Koenig & Al Myles, Social Security’s Impact on the Na-




alyzing multiplier effect of social security benefits). In 
contrast, stronger protections against age discrimina-
tion allow older workers to obtain new jobs more easily, 
delaying the age at which they claim Social Security 
benefits. Neumark & Song, Do Stronger Age Discrimi-
nation Laws Make Social Security Reforms More Effec-




economy; the workers increase their savings and 
avoid having to accept a lower level of benefits, while 
also paying into the Social Security system for longer. 
Neumark & Song, supra, at 31-32; Maestas & Zissi-
mopoulos, supra, at 158.  
 
III. SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH SUGGESTS 
THAT LIABILITY FOR DISPARATE IM-
PACT IN HIRING HELPS TO REDUCE 
AGE DISCRIMINATION 
 Social science evidence discussed above suggests 
that age discrimination in hiring remains significant. 
Social science evidence also suggests, as explained be-
low, that discrimination can be reduced by legal inter-
vention, at least where threat of legal liability is 
significant. Yet disparate treatment law alone does too 
little to prevent discrimination caused by neutral poli-
cies that reflect stereotyped assessments of merit. See 
Lauren B. Edelman, Working Law: Courts, Corpora-
tions, and Symbolic Civil Rights 59-60 (2016) (arguing 
that racial and gender segregation and other employ-
ment inequities persist because disparate treatment 
law allows organizations to adopt symbolic nondis-
crimination policies without addressing the practices 
that perpetuate discrimination). This case is an exam-
ple: assuming that people two or three years out of col-
lege and with less than eight years of sales experience 
would be better territory managers reflects stereo-
typed thinking about sales and about age, and it re-
sulted in less than one percent of those hired being 
over 40, but proving the requirement was adopted with 
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the intent to exclude workers protected by the ADEA 
is not without difficulty. The availability of disparate 
impact claims is important to uncover and eliminate 
this form of age discrimination in hiring.  
 Further, given that workers can bring disparate 
impact claims regarding decisions made after hiring, 
the unavailability of disparate impact liability at the 
hiring stage could create perverse incentives for em-
ployers. Neumark, Is It Harder for Older Workers To 
Find Jobs?, supra, at 2. Where employers face greater 
risks of liability if they fire (or otherwise disadvantage) 
an older worker than if they simply do not hire older 
workers in the first place, they will be better off dis-
criminating at the outset than hiring an older worker 
and risking a discrimination case later on. This risk is 
already present to a degree, due to the difficulty of 
winning failure-to-hire cases and the likelihood that 
damages will be smaller in failure-to-hire than in ter-
mination cases. Neumark & Song, Do Stronger Age 
Discrimination Laws Make Social Security Reforms 
More Effective?, supra, at 2; see also Lahey, supra, at 31 
(reasoning that “firms that wish to retain only a cer-
tain type of worker without being sued would prefer to 
discriminate in the hiring stage” because “it is more 
difficult for workers to determine why they failed to 
receive an interview than it is for workers to determine 
why they have been fired”); Neumark & Button, Did 
Age Discrimination Protections Help Older Workers 
Weather the Great Recession?, supra, at 566. But per-
mitting older workers to pursue disparate impact 
cases only after they have been hired would exacerbate 
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this dynamic. Disparate impact liability for discrimi-
natory hiring practices may be the best mechanism to 
avoid this perverse incentive and change personnel 
policies that, as in this case, are based on stereotypes 
about the abilities of older workers. 
 Social scientific studies show that stronger age 
discrimination laws are associated with less age dis-
crimination without reducing labor market efficiency. 
David Neumark & Wendy A. Stock, Age Discrimination 
Laws and Labor Market Efficiency, 107 J. Pol. Econ. 
1081 (1999) (comparing age-earnings profiles in states 
with stronger and weaker age discrimination laws). 
One study found that older workers were less likely to 
claim Social Security benefits in states with stronger 
age discrimination laws, which suggests that older em-
ployees more easily find and retain employment where 
age discrimination laws are stronger. Neumark & 
Song, supra at 2. But because of the difficulty of meas-
uring age discrimination and attributing differences in 
employment of older workers to differences in law, see 
Neumark & Button, supra, it is difficult to empirically 
demonstrate the impact of age discrimination law. It is 
possible, however, to extrapolate from the abundant re-
search on race and gender to see that anti-discrimination 
law generally, and the disparate impact framework 
specifically, reduce employment discrimination in hir-
ing. 
 Empirical social science research on employment 
discrimination has found that anti-discrimination laws 
are correlated with greater race and gender diversity 
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in formerly white male job categories. Formal person-
nel policies in the absence of legal accountability have 
been found to have no effects on the racial and gender 
diversity of managers, but nondiscrimination policies 
coupled with legal or supervisory accountability for re-
sults do have an effect. Frank Dobbin, et al., Rage 
Against the Iron Cage: The Varied Effects of Bureau-
cratic Personnel Reforms on Diversity, 80 Am. Soc. Rev. 
1014 (2015). Class action suits by both women and 
Blacks increased their representation in management 
by about 20 percent in the year following the suit, al- 
though women’s gains endured while Black gains 
eroded to about ten percent after an additional year. 
Sheryl Skaggs, Legal Political Pressures and African 
American Access to Managerial Jobs, 74 Am. Soc. Rev. 
225 (2009); Sheryl Skaggs, Producing Change or Bag-
ging Opportunity? The Effects of Discrimination Liti-
gation on Women in Supermarket Management, 113 
Am. J. Soc. 1148 (2008). Similarly, when a court order 
resulting from a discrimination charge or lawsuit in-
cludes managerial accountability for diversity gains, 
the access of white women, black men, and black 
women to managerial jobs increases. C. Elizabeth 
Hirsh, The Strength of Weak Enforcement: The Impact 
of Discrimination Charges on Sex and Race Segrega-
tion in the Workplace, 74 Am. Soc. Rev. 245 (2009); 
C. Elizabeth Hirsh and Youngjoo Cha, Mandating 
Change: The Impact of Court-Ordered Policy Changes 




 Social scientists have also found that race and 
gender workforce segregation declined during the pe-
riod when there was vigorous enforcement of employ-
ment discrimination laws. One would expect vigorous 
enforcement of age discrimination laws would simi-
larly be effective in reducing age discrimination. Seg-
regation of white men from black men and women of 
all races declined dramatically during the 1973 – 1980 
period, after Griggs. Kevin Stainback and Donald To-
maskovic-Devey, Documenting Desegregation: Racial 
and Gender Segregation in Private-Sector Employment 
Since the Civil Rights Act xxii, 128-30 (2012). Segrega-
tion between white men and black men dropped rap-
idly from the late 1960s to 1980, net of shifts caused by 
changes in jobs and the economy. Id. at 128. The gender 
segregation between white women and white men be-
gan to decline slightly later than race segregation 
among men, but it too declined rapidly in the 1970s. Id. 
at 130. The rapid gender desegregation of the 1970s 
slowed after 1980 but continued to decline gradually 
between 1980 and 2000, and then stopped. Id. at 168.  
 To determine whether the declines in discrimi-
nation were the result of voluntary compliance or 
changes in attitudes independent of the threat of legal 
enforcement, Stainback and Tomaskovich-Devey com-
pared firms subject to scrutiny by the Office of Federal 
Contract Compliance (OFCC) and other comparable 
firms. (The OFCC audits EEO data of federal contrac-
tors and, in theory, contractors can face adverse conse-
quences for failing an audit.) Black men made larger 
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and faster gains in advancement into managerial, pro-
fessional, and craft jobs in OFCC-reporting firms than 
in noncontractor firms during the period from the ef-
fective date of the Civil Rights Act to 1980. Id. at 143. 
See also Frank Dobbin, Inventing Equal Opportunity 
49-50 (2009) (defense contractors that faced debar-
ment for discrimination hired nearly ten times the 
number of blacks they hired prior to federal govern-
ment threatening to debar companies that discrimi-
nated). During this period, class action suits were 
associated with increased black employment and 
movement into managerial jobs. Jonathan Leonard, 
Employment and Occupational Advance Under Affirm-
ative Action, 66 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 377 (1984). The 
rapid decrease in occupational race segregation in the 
early 1970s may have been caused by the fact that 
class action suits result in legal commands to change 
firm behavior and also serve as a threat to other firms. 
John Donohue & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Na-
ture of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 
Stan. L. Rev. 983 (1991).  
 As noted, it is difficult to extrapolate from the data 
on race and gender to age. Although social scientists 
have concluded that the pre-1980 “progress toward ra-
cial desegregation in the private sector . . . was pro-
duced by regulatory or political pressure rather than 
by changes in the industrial structure or labor supply,” 
Stainback & Tomaskovic-Devey, supra, at 167, the reg-
ulatory pressure, attitude changes, and affirmative ac-
tion did not extend from the Title VII context to the 
ADEA. The ADEA did not have the early enforcement 
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surge that Title VII did, as responsibility for its en-
forcement bounced from the Department of Labor to 
the EEOC, and in the case of age there was no compa-
rable consensus about the need for affirmative action 
to head off social unrest. Compare, e.g., John David 
Skrentny, The Ironies of Affirmative Action (1996). As 
a result, social science evidence about the effect of vig-
orous enforcement of age discrimination law is not as 
strong as the evidence about the effect of Title VII. 
 Nevertheless, the available data provide a basis 
for inferring that the availability of disparate impact 
hiring claims would eliminate stereotyped hiring crite-
ria like the preference for recent college graduates at 
issue here. Consent decrees or court orders prohibiting 
use of discriminatory selection criteria reduce discrim-
ination directly, as in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 
U.S. 424 (1971). Litigation reduces discrimination in-
directly when HR departments or in-house counsel 
fear litigation and direct firms to change policies that 
cannot be justified as being reasonable. Human re-
source organizations follow court cases closely and 
offer immediate updates to companies, frequently sug-
gesting steps to take in response to court decisions. For 
example, after Cline v. General Dynamics Land Sys-
tems, 296 F.3d 466, 471 (6th Cir. 2002), vacated, 540 
U.S. 581 (2004), when the Sixth Circuit held that work-
ers over 40 could state a discrimination claim when 
they received worse treatment than workers over 50, 
organizations were quick to notify businesses even 
before this Court granted review and vacated the Sixth 
Circuit decision. See Gillian Flynn, The Maturing of 
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the ADEA, Workforce (October 2002), http://www. 
workforce.com/2002/09/27/the-maturing-of-the-adea 
(advising human resource departments to “ensure that 
[they] have a justifiable business basis” for a change 
in policies “before [they] enact” the policy to “insulate 
[the company] against a disparate-impact claim”); 
see also Jonathan Pont, Ruling Gives a New Basis 
for Age-Bias Claims, Workforce (April 26, 2005), http:// 
www.workforce.com/2005/04/26/ruling-gives-a-new-basis- 
for-age-bias-claims/ (stating that after Smith v. City of 
Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005), companies should review 
employment practices); Paul Salvatore, Age Case Tops 
Supreme’s List, HUMAN RESOURCE EXECUTIVE ONLINE 
(April 2, 2005), http://www.hreonline.com/HRE/view/ 
story.jhtml?id=4278238&ss=disparate+impact&s=54#ctx 
(advising HR departments to “carefully consider any 
practices or policies . . . that may, unintentionally, have 
a negative and disproportionate impact on employees 
over 40” in light of Smith); Paul Gallagher, Age-Bias 
Claims to Rise?, HUMAN RESOURCE EXECUTIVE ONLINE 
(June 23, 2008), http://www.hreonline.com/HRE/view/ 
story.jhtml?id=104331306&ss=disparate+impact&s=36 
(discussing need for companies to develop policies gov-
erning layoffs in light of Meacham v. Knolls Atomic 
Power Laboratory, 553 U.S. 84 (2008)).  
 Disparate impact liability does more than spread 
organizational awareness of the specific issues. Suc-
cessful claims prompt broad changes in management 
practices. History demonstrates that anti-discrimination 
regulations “from the early 1960s stimulated corporate 
America to develop the precursors to today’s diversity 
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programs.” Frank Dobbin & Alexandra Kalev, The Ori-
gins and Effects of Corporate Diversity Programs, in 
The Oxford Handbook of Diversity and Work 253, 254 
(Quinetta M. Roberson, ed., 2013). These changes only 
increased over time. For example, “Title VII lawsuits 
and affirmative action compliance reviews [have] led 
to increases in women’s and minorities’ share of man-
agement jobs, especially in periods and judicial circuits 
wherein civil rights enforcement was strong.” Alexan-
dra Kalev, et al., Best Practices or Best Guesses? As-
sessing the Efficacy of Corporate Affirmative Action 
and Diversity Policies, 71 Am. Soc. Rev. 589, 612 (2006). 
The prospect of Title VII claims motivate companies to 
adopt structures or practices to comply with the law.” 
Margo Schlanger & Pauline Kim, The Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission and Structural Reform 
of the American Workplace, 91 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1519, 
1584 (2014) (discussing widespread adoption of anti-
harassment policies). Similarly, here, allowing dispar-
ate impact in hiring claims under the ADEA will help 
prompt companies to make the necessary structural 
changes to avoid discrimination.  










 For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant 
certiorari on the first question presented. 
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